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Essay 
The (Joseph) Stories of Newmyer and Cover:         
Hero or Tragedy? 
JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN 
Kent Newmyer’s classics Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of 
the Old Republic and John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court are 
important stories about the architects and heroes of the rule of law in America. In 
Newmyer’s account, Story played a crucial role preserving the republic and 
building a legal nation out of rival states, and Newmyer’s Story is fundamentally 
important for students of American history. But in Robert Cover’s account in 
Justice Accused on northern judges’ deference to slavery, Story is an anti-hero. 
Sometimes Story stayed silent. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Story overvalued 
formalistic comity. This Essay suggests that Story missed vital opportunities to 
write a judicial opinion more forcefully recognizing the rights of fugitive slaves 
under the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, a preview of Dred Scott but in 
reverse.    
One can find a balance between Newmyer’s empathetic charity and Cover’s 
non-empathetic clarity, to see the value of the rule of law through both 


































The (Joseph) Stories of Newmyer and Cover:          
Hero or Tragedy? 
JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN * 
 “As [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes put it, ‘[Justice Joseph Story] 
has done more than any other English-speaking man in this century to 
make the law luminous and easy to understand.’”1 R. Kent Newmyer 
brings in this apt description in his epilogue to Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic.2 It’s all the more appropriate 
on this occasion because Newmyer makes his subjects—America’s great 
justices—luminous, and makes their decisions, their complex ideas, and 
their legacies easy to understand.  
Newmyer does not achieve luminosity by oversimplifying these men 
or the law they made. He grapples with their complexities and 
contradictions, but he also has a gift for context and for humanizing these 
jurist giants in black robes. Newmyer hails Chief Justice John Marshall as 
a hero in a heroic age, and then nails Chief Justice Roger Taney as a villain 
in a villainous age. His books John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the 
Supreme Court3 and The Supreme Court Under Marshall and Taney4 are 
legal history classics, insightfully synthesizing for lawyers, and readably 
familiarizing for non-lawyers (and without overly lionizing). But 
Newmyer’s best work is Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of 
the Old Republic (1985).5 
Yale History PhDs have been handing down from generation to 
generation a model reading list for our third-year oral examinations. There 
are many outstanding legal historians with long careers and only one book 
on the list; many more aspire to have one book on the list. Newmyer is a 
member of a small club with multiple books on that list, and they deserve 
to be on it for any student who wants to understand law, politics, and 
culture from the Founding to the Civil War. Newmyer shows how 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Mary Bilder and Steven Wilf for wonderful 
contributions and to Kent Newmyer for the inspiration.  
1 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD 
REPUBLIC 383 (G. Edward White ed., 1985). 
2 Id. 
3 R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT (2001). 
4 R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY (1968). 
5 NEWMYER, supra note 1. 
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biography is a powerful way to understand how those forces shaped 
Americans’ lived experiences and American law. 
Biography is also enormously challenging. It is one thing to construct a 
book around an argument, and to pick and choose discrete moments to 
make such a book manageable. But constructing a book around a person 
imposes a duty to capture both the whole person and the world around 
them—over many decades. He opens his book with an anecdote from the 
archives, where a “bedraggled” old man confronted him about working on 
a Story biography.6 “Young man . . . studying Joseph Story could ruin your 
career!”7 
Instead, Newmyer dug deep into Story’s life, and in turn, Story 
propelled Newmyer on a start of an illustrious career. How did he avoid the 
pitfalls of biography? I offer two observations. First, Newmyer had a 
thesis: he relied on Story’s life to trace civic republicanism’s journey in 
America from anti-imperial revolution to nationalistic conservatism.8 It’s a 
story that explains some puzzles and surprises in American history: why 
and how the Revolution happened; why the early republic—as it grew to 
span a continent and increasingly depended on slavery and immigration—
did not fracture across party lines or geographic lines for so long; why 
elites failed to confront slavery for so long; and after Story’s death, why 
northern elites did not simply wave goodbye when the South seceded. 
Newmyer was writing in the midst of American historians doing the best 
work on republicanism in the Atlantic world, and he drew on those insights 
to drive a big biography with some big ideas. Newmyer also addressed one 
of the problems with this historiography. One critique is that these 
historians made civic republicanism too abstract, and not concrete or 
human enough. It’s hard for judges to interpret law through the civic 
republican turn if the ideas are vague. But Newmyer’s biography 
succeeded in making these ideas more comprehensible, which in turn helps 
scholars and judges understand constitutional history. 
A second observation about biography is that it helps to have an 
emotional connection to the subject. The history profession’s old goal of 
“objectivity” is not only a fantasy (that “noble dream”9), but it can also 
drag down a project. It seemed to me—and I am speculating—that 
Newmyer succeeded because he grew to love and sympathize with Joseph 
Story. The story of civic republicanism and conservative capitalist 
nationalism comes alive because Newmyer wanted to bring Story to life.  
                                                                                                                     
6 Id. at ix. 
7 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8 Id. at xv–xvi.  
9 See, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1–3 (1988) (discussing the goal of objectivity among historians). 
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Another great legal scholar who studied Story shows the power of the 
opposite emotional approach. Robert Cover wrote the seminal Justice 
Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process10 coming out of the civil 
rights era and Vietnam era with intensely negative feelings towards the 
antebellum judges who knew that slavery was wrong, but used formalism 
and procedure to avoid confronting or combatting slavery. It would be 
unfair to contrast Cover as having enmity for Story, as opposed to 
Newmyer’s empathy; to suggest villain versus hero. But it is fair to say that 
Cover is driven by moral outrage over the retreat to formalism in order to 
hide from conscience. It may be fair to contrast Newmyer’s 
Story-as-tragic-hero versus Cover’s Story-as-anti-hero (a Cover Story? 
Sorry.). 
Here is a concise summary of Cover’s account: Story was a pioneer in 
conflict-of-laws and comity (one jurisdiction recognizing the different 
rules of another jurisdiction). Story wrote that only “natural” qualifications 
and disqualifications deserved comity.11 Cover wrote, “[S]lavery was his 
primary illustration for this principle” when Story wrote in 1834.12 Cover 
then tells a story of a series of cases in which Story condemns slavery 
either through his adoption of precedents in his legal publications (such as 
Lord Mansfield’s Somerset decision against slavery’s legality in 
England)13 or in his decisions. Both Cover and Newmyer emphasize his 
anti-slavery opinion in La Jeune Eugenie while riding circuit in 1822. 
Story does not hold back on the evils: 
What is the fact as to the ordinary, nay, necessary course, of 
this trade? It begins in corruption, and plunder, and 
kidnapping. It creates and stimulates unholy wars for the 
purpose of making captives. It desolates whole villages and 
provinces for the purpose of seizing the young, the feeble, the 
defenceless, and the innocent. It breaks down all the ties of 
parent, and children, and family, and country. It shuts up all 
sympathy for human suffering and sorrows. It manacles the 
inoffensive females and the starving infants. It forces the 
brave to untimely death in defence of their humble homes 
and firesides, or drives them to despair and self-immolation. 
It stirs up the worst passions of the human soul, darkening 
the spirit of revenge, sharpening the greediness of avarice, 
brutalizing the selfish, envenoming the cruel, famishing the 
                                                                                                                     
10 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). 
11 Id. at 86. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 87. 
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weak, and crushing to death the broken-hearted. This is but 
the beginning of the evils.14 
Cover highlights Story’s bigger picture jurisprudential point: “the 
nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of 
nations,”15 meaning the natural law of freedom should be read into 
international law. Thus, Story ruled against the slave trade.16  
But then Story’s results are more mixed. In Antelope in 1825, Chief 
Justice John Marshall ruled the opposite way in favor of the slave trade, 
relying on positive law that creates slavery, rather than natural law that 
would limit it.17 Newmyer, not Cover, notes that Story “entered no dissent” 
in Antelope.18 Newmyer puts his emphasis on the legacy of the earlier 
anti-slavery opinion: “Story, at any rate, never changed his mind on the 
correctness of his Eugenie doctrine, Marshall and The Antelope 
notwithstanding.”19 Notwithstanding? Marshall’s decision in Antelope may 
not have formally overturned La Jeune Eugenie, but it sharply limited it. 
Yet Story failed to dissent.20  
After more time passed, in the 1841 case Amistad, Story ruled in favor 
of freeing slaves who had mutinied on board slave ships and eventually 
landed in New York.21 Both Cover and Newmyer mildly praised Story’s 
role.22 But both authors underscored that Story again relied on positive 
“municipal law,” the narrower fact that Spain abolished slavery, rather than 
broader human rights against slavery.23 Both Cover and Newmyer criticize 
Story’s narrow and increasingly positivistic position.24 Interestingly, 
Newmyer devotes time to explaining why political events constrained 
Story’s latitude (more sympathetically to Story’s political challenges).25 
But Newmyer also criticized Story’s approach to find a way to rule in 
favor of both sides, calling it “bad faith.”26 On a more positive note, he also 
goes on to explain how another court that same year relied on Story’s 
earlier decisions on conflict-of-laws (including Amistad) to free slaves who 
had mutinied.27 Amistad is a celebrated case, but to his credit Newmyer is 
                                                                                                                     
14 United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551). 
15 Id. at 846. 
16 Id. 
17 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 90 (1825). 
18 NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 348. 
19 Id. at 350. 
20 Id. 
21 United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 588, 597 (1841). 
22 COVER, supra note 10, at 114–15; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369. Poetically, the case title 
means United States v. Friendship, a bit like the later case, Virginia v. Loving. 
23 COVER, supra note 10, at 114; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369. 
24 COVER, supra note 10, at 115; NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 369. 




2021] HERO OR TRAGEDY? 1257 
balanced and more critical of Story than our popular culture might have 
expected. 
Another 1841 slavery controversy, Groves v. Slaughter,28 again 
challenged Story’s moral position. Mississippi’s Constitution prohibited 
importing slaves for sale.29 Slaughter had sold imported slaves in 
Mississippi, but the buyers refused to pay because they claimed the illegal 
sale was unenforceable.30 Justice Smith Thompson, writing for the 
majority, held that the state constitutional provision by itself was not 
self-executing, and because the legislature had not passed legislation to 
implement it, it was unenforceable.31 Justice John McLean, more strongly 
than ever announcing his anti-slavery views, concurred for a different 
reason: the contract was unenforceable because trafficking humans was a 
creature of local law and, therefore, not enforceable.32 Other Justices took 
the opportunity to write more stridently pro-slavery decisions: Chief 
Justice Roger Taney invoked states’ rights to deny any federal role to 
regulate slavery,33 and Justice Henry Baldwin made a mirror image 
argument that the Fifth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause protected slave owners’ rights and should invalidate the state 
constitutional amendment.34 Taney would later adopt Baldwin’s argument 
and recognize a substantive due process right for slave owners in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.35 
But Story weighed in on none of these positions, because he voted to 
concur while issuing no opinion of his own.36 Story had an opportunity to 
stand with McLean against slavery by invoking constitutional clauses for 
slaves, not their owners. But he never did. And his concurrence signaled 
his approval for the states’ rights approach. Surprisingly, neither Cover nor 
Newmyer focused on his silence or criticized him for missing an 
opportunity to speak out on his anti-slavery views.37 
This now brings us to the most controversial case in this line of 
fugitive slaves and personal liberty laws cases: Prigg v. Pennsylvania.38 
Pennsylvania state law prohibited blacks from being removed,39 but Justice 
Story ruled for a majority that the federal Fugitive Slave Law preempted 
                                                                                                                     
28 Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841). 
29 Id. at 449. 
30 Id. at 455. 
31 Id. at 501–02. 
32 Id. at 506–08. 
33 Id. at 508. 
34 Id. at 515–17. 
35 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451–54 (1856). 
36 Groves, 40 U.S. at 510 (Story, J., concurring). 
37 See COVER, supra note 10; NEWMYER, supra note 1 (discussing Justice Story without 
criticizing him for a missed opportunity to speak out on his anti-slavery views). 
38 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
39 Id. at 539. 
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the state anti-slavery law.40 At the same time, Story’s decision gave states 
latitude to pass new statutes that would forbid state officials from 
cooperating in the return of fugitive slaves. Over time, Story had become 
increasingly formalistic and curtailed his earlier efforts. 
Robert Cover unsurprisingly focused on Story’s decision as a 
paradigmatic example judge putting formalism over fairness.41 Story was 
an expert in comity, and he couldn’t craft a way for the state statute to 
survive? Especially given how he had written before about freedom and 
natural law prevailing over slavery and positive law? Story and the 
majority overstated how crucial the Fugitive Slave clause was in the 
Constitutional Convention for keeping the South on board, as if it were the 
dealmaker or deal breaker. Cover writes with implicit irony that Cover 
viewed the acceptance of the Fugitive Slave clause as “a test of the good 
faith of the participants in the national undertaking,”42 if the Justices were 
going to stick to the exaggerated bargain of 1787 in order to keep the 
nation together. Cover writes:  
Story’s role in Prigg v. Pennsylvania is more difficult to 
fathom. . . . What was new in Prigg was Story’s very weak 
reasoning that the prohibition of the “discharge” of a fugitive 
in Article IV [of the Constitution] must be interpreted to 
exclude any interposition of process that might operate to 
“delay” or “qualify” the enjoyment of the right protected. 
Such word teasing was especially unconvincing in light of 
McLean’s dissent that included a forceful policy attack 
against self-help.43  
“[W]ord teasing” is a generous way to phrase it. Here is the text of the 
Fugitive Slave clause: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of 
any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the 
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.44 
“Discharge” meant the final freeing of a slave. Surely, a state 
providing protective measures to confirm a suspected fugitive’s identity 
would neither mean “discharge” nor be a failure to “deliver.” Providing 
extra process under state law could have been read to be consistent with 
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. at 625–26. 
41 See COVER, supra note 10, at 166–67 (illustrating how Justice Story decided the case). 
42 Id. at 240. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 162. 
 
2021] HERO OR TRAGEDY? 1259 
the clause, or at least using the canon of constitutional avoidance, the 
Supreme Court could have interpreted the clause to be only delay, and not 
discharge. Moreover, note the clause’s use of the word “due,” which hints 
at the “due process” clause. How is a state supposed to know to whom 
such service is due, unless it pursues due process with concrete steps? 
Would that still be a conflict of law? Preemption was not so developed in 
the nineteenth century, and it certainly was not so iron-clad and concrete a 
doctrine that Story couldn’t find a way to salvage some of the state 
Personal Freedom provisions. 
Finally, this point about that small word “due” raises a question that is 
not addressed in any of the Prigg opinions, nor by Cover or Newmyer: if 
just a year earlier, the pro-slavery Justices invoked the Fifth Amendment 
for slave-owners in Groves v. Slaughter, why not invoke it for the slaves 
themselves in Prigg? The claims by fugitive slaves for procedural 
protections under state law are more “process” than the arguably 
oxymoronic invocation of substantive due process for slave-owners by 
Justice Baldwin in Groves.45 In fact, one of the most flagrantly egregiously 
unfair aspects of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (an act shaped by Prigg) 
was that it paid commissioners twice as much to rule that the suspect was a 
fugitive rather than free. Imagine if somehow Justices Story and McLean 
had announced in some format—not necessarily a majority opinion, but 
just a concurrence or a dissent—the plausibility of a due process claim for 
suspected fugitives. It clearly fit the constitutional text “due” in both 
Article IV and in the Fifth Amendment. It was at least a missed 
opportunity for Justice Story to voice his conscience, while also exhibiting 
a brilliant and creative legal mind. The fact that he did not attempt such an 
argument is also a hint that he was seeking political compromise, not legal 
protection. 
Newmyer is more generous and sympathetic. He takes Story seriously, 
as a realistic nationalist seeking compromise, and as someone who knows a 
forceful dissent or a clever concurrence does not make law or concrete 
change. Newmyer is also sharply critical: “‘Masks of the law are of two 
kinds,’ according to John Noonan, Jr., ‘those imposed on others and those 
put on oneself.’”46 This critique is consistent with Cover’s thesis about 
American judges setting aside their own consciences to adopt the formalist 
role of a judge: putting a mask of performative, professional formalism on 
oneself to cover over a more human moral sense. I have relied on these 
concepts of role fidelity in my own work in legal history and torts.47 
Newmyer is insightful in his own critique of Story’s opinion, noting 
                                                                                                                     
45 Groves, 40 U.S. at 515. 
46 NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 370 (citation omitted). 
47 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and 
American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1355 (2010). 
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Story’s “failure to distinguish between state law applying to fugitive slaves 
and those applying to free blacks was crucial.”48 Story’s defense, that states 
could order their officials not to assist, seems more like a 
conscience-soothing boycott to keep one’s hands clean, rather than get 
one’s hands dirty in the work of justice and resistance. 
It’s more like the midwestern bloc of the Republican coalition that 
joined with Lincoln not because of abolition and more because of 
anti-expansion: they did not want slavery—and specifically African 
slaves— moving near them, competing against them at lower cost, and 
devaluing their own labor.49 Story offered Northerners the chance to 
boycott and free their conscience, but at the cost of the state power to resist 
and free humans.50 Story doesn’t acknowledge the hypocrisy of the South 
asserting states’ rights to protect slavery while demanding federal judicial 
power to allow them to override states’ rights and, as slavecatcher, ride 
into northern states. 
Newmyer gives Story and his son several pages and a lot of latitude to 
justify the decision, even if Newmyer adds his skepticism to these 
justifications: 
The complication comes from what Story himself (and his 
son, too) thought he had accomplished. Upon his return to 
Massachusetts in the spring of 1842, he spoke of his opinion 
in Prigg “repeatedly and earnestly” to his family and friends 
as a “triumph of freedom.”51 
To his credit, Newmyer sharply contrasts what Story did and what he 
says he did. Newmyer is rightly skeptical. But Newmyer’s telling comes 
across as Story’s confusion or self-delusion. It is worth contemplating if 
Story was acting in good or bad faith, that he knew he had compromised 
not only politically but in the gravest moral sense, and was desperate to tell 
others and himself it was not betrayal. This is more than a 
“complication,”52 more like a moral crisis that Cover sees.  
And this is a challenge in biography. How much should an author 
credit their subjects for how they see themselves and describe themselves 
to the world? How much should the author generously interpret them as 
operating in good faith, or critically in bad faith? There is no sign that 
Story was in cognitive or emotional decline in 1842. But it’s hard to read 
his Prigg opinion and then his own celebration of it as a “triumph of 
                                                                                                                     
48 NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 373–74. 
49 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 3–4 (1970). 
50 NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 373–74. 
51 NEWMYER, supra note 1, at 372.  
52 Id.  
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freedom,”53 and not instead see a tragedy for freedom, a tragedy of regret 
and guilt, of a judicial career built on pursuing justice and fairness, and to 
then realize on some haunting level that all those years of work and genius 
led him to a zenith in the legal triumph for slave hunters. Story sacrificed 
his principles of freedom for nationalism and comity, but he died before he 
could see how all these compromises—including the spreading conflict 
over fugitive slaves and slave hunters—still tore the country apart into civil 
war.54  
In light of these deep failings by Story in Prigg and missed 
opportunities in Antelope, Groves, and Amistad, how should we think of 
Story? Is Cover right in Justice Accused to make it partially “Story 
Accused”? Cover may have been too cynical, but it is key to understand 
that Cover’s thesis is not about lying and deception. He is making a deeper 
point about the banality of evil. Judges like Story enabled the evil of 
slavery by conceiving of their role as juridical bureaucrat. And this may be 
an implicit or unintentional critique in Newmyer’s title. Whereas Arendt’s 
bureaucrat can enable evil through role fidelity triumphing over 
conscience, so too can Newmyer’s statesman participate in “heroic” evil. 
The goals may be noble: the rule of law, stability, compromise. But by 
putting on the mask of “statesman” and “hero,” what evils are our leaders 
enabling? Are they compromising our most basic principles for their heroic 
legacy?  
Perhaps the bottom line is to find a balance between Newmyer’s 
empathetic charity and Cover’s non-empathetic clarity. And perhaps a 
bottom line today is that the rule of law is just as important as ever. It 
depends on being wise and reflective about how the rule of law is 
constructed and whom it is supposed to serve. In the 2020s, it is more 
difficult to see Story’s core value of “nationalism” as a noble or heroic 
principle worth sacrificing fellow humans’ life and liberty, and worth 
sacrificing the civic republican ideals that first propelled Story to 
greatness. 
A final bottom line is that we can engage in these debates to help us 
understand our current crisis of republicanism and the rule of law vs. 
nationalism, our current crisis of statesmen vs. demagogues, because we 
have learned so much from outstanding and thoughtful legal scholars like 
Robert Cover and Kent Newmyer.  
                                                                                                                     
53 Id.  
54 See A Man of Letters: Joseph Story (1775-1845), HARV. L. TODAY (Oct. 1, 2012), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/a-man-of-letters-joseph-story/ (noting Story’s death year); Dr. James 
McPherson, A Brief Overview of the American Civil War, AM. BATTLEFIELD TR., 
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/brief-overview-american-civil-war (noting the date of the 
start of the Civil War) (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
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Kent, thank you for your expert craft of biography, and through 
biography, thank you for teaching us about law, leadership, and life. 
 
  
 
 
